About
I am a tenured associate professor at the Gaoling School of Artificial Intelligence, Renmin University of China. I studied in the Experimental Class of Computer Science at Tsinghua University and received my Ph.D. from Tsinghua University in 2016, advised by Pingzhong Tang and Andrew Chi-Chih Yao.
My research interests include:
- AI for science: Using AI to explore scientific questions, including algorithms and approximation algorithms, auction theory, and information design, with a focus on computational and game-theoretic problems in scientific research.
- The economics of AI: Studying emerging economic issues in the age of AI, including data trading, online advertising auctions, and new advertising models.
Students
- Zeyu Ren, ByteDance
- Liang Shan, Shandong University of Finance and Economics
- Yan Liu, Zhengzhou University
- Zhicheng Du
- Shuo Zhang
- Ying Qin, qinying0420@ruc.edu.cn
- Boyu Liu, liuboyu03@ruc.edu.cn
- You Zhang, zhangyouyyds@163.com
Selected Publications
- Private Private Information in Second-Price Auction.
- Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders
- Improved Approximation Ratios of Fixed-Price Mechanisms in Bilateral Trades
- A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions.
- Optimal Commitments in Auctions with Incomplete Information.
- Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items.
- Optimal Mechanisms with Simple Menus
Full Publication List
- Mechanism Design via Market-Clearing Prices for Value Maximizers under Budget and RoS Constraints
- Prices as Signals: Joint Design of Information and Pricing
- Algorithmic Information Design for Searchers with Uncertain Alternatives
- Private Private Information in Second-Price Auction.
- Selling Data as a Digital Good with Scaling Valuations.
- Deterministic implementation in single-item auctions.
- Intelli-Planner: Towards Customized Urban Planning via Large Language Model Empowered Reinforcement Learning
- Pacing Equilibria in Second-Price Auctions with Few Buyers
- Striking the Balance: Optimizing Pricing Schemes for Time-Sensitive Buyers
- Ex-Ante Truthful Distribution-Reporting Mechanisms
- Multiplayer General Lotto game
- Approximating EFX through a New Notion of Fairness
- On the design of truthful mechanisms for the capacitated facility location problem with two and more facilities
- On the Oscillations in Cournot Games with Best Response Strategies
- On the Distortion of Multi-winner Election Using Single-Candidate Ballots
- Simultaneous All-Pay Auctions with Budget Constraints
- Stackelberg vs. Nash in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game
- Competitive Information Design with Asymmetric Senders
- Facility Location Problems with Capacity Constraints: Two Facilities and Beyond
- Edge-Centric Pricing Mechanisms with Selfish Heterogeneous Users
- Enhancing Multi-modal Cooperation via Sample-level Modality Valuation
- On Truthful Item Acquiring Mechanisms for Reward Maximization
- Cost Minimization for Equilibrium Transition
- Bounded Incentives in Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule
- Improved Approximation Ratios of Fixed-Price Mechanisms in Bilateral Trades
- Node Conversion Optimization in Multi-hop Influence Networks
- Optimal Pricing Schemes for Identical Items with Time-Sensitive Buyers
- A Competitive Analysis of Online Failure-Aware Assignment
- Optimal Anonymous Independent Reward Scheme Design
- Optimal Pricing Policy Design for Selling Cost-Reducing Innovation in Cournot Games
- Relaxing the independence assumption in sequential posting pricing, prophet inequality, and random bipartite matching
- Distributed Game-Theoretical Route Navigation for Vehicular Crowdsensing
- Dynamic Online User Recruitment with (Non-)submodular Utility in Mobile Crowd Sensing
- A Game-theoretical Approach to Analyze Film Release Time
- Optimized Cost per Mille in Feeds Advertising
- Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in First-Price Auction with Discrete Value Distributions
- Optimal Common Contract with Heterogeneous Agents.
- Bounded Incentives in Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule.
- Inference from Auction Prices.
- Making Money from What You Know - How to Sell Information.
- Ex-post IR dynamic auctions with cost-per-action payments.
- A tighter welfare guarantee for first-price auctions.
- Optimal Mechanisms with Simple Menus.
- Hotelling-Downs Model with Limited Attraction.
- Computational Issues in Time-Inconsistent Planning.
- Optimal Commitments in Auctions with Incomplete Information.
- Optimal Auctions for Negatively Correlated Items.
- Optimal Auctions for Partially Rational Bidders.
- Optimal Mechanisms with Simple Menus